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I will respect whatever the consilium of experts approve.
The Chief Public Health Officer makes the final decision.
Igor Matovič, The Prime Minister of Slovakia
(“Igor Matovič stojí za,” 2020)
Hi people, the public demanded that we loosen up
[Covid-19 restrictions over the summer of 2020],
and so, we did. Unfortunately, we were wrong.
Andrej Babiš, The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic
(“Čau lidi, byla poptávka,” 2020)
1. Introduction
On August 31, 2020, Andrej Babiš uttered the follow-
ing words at the Strategic Forum in Slovenia: “My pro-
fession is businessman, crisis manager, actually Prime
Minister of the Czech Republic…we have results, best
in Covid” (Bled Strategic Forum, 2020). His statement
reflected the general sentiment following the first wave
of the pandemic in Europe. The Czech Republic quick-
ly introduced strict measures including mask mandates
and seemed to have had the virus under control by early
summer 2020. On June 30, thousands of Czechs par-
ticipated in a farewell party to the pandemic on the
Charles Bridge in Prague. However, by mid-October, the
Czech Republic had recordedmore new cases per million
people than any other country in the world (Lázňovský,
2020). In May, Igor Matovič also touted Slovakia as “best
in Covid” and emphasized that it had the lowest death
rates in the European Union (“Bulharsko a Čierna Hora,”
2020). By October, infections started to surge, which
forced Slovakia to re-introduce tough freedom of move-
ment restrictions. Technocratic populists in both coun-
tries responded quickly to the pandemic threat in the
spring, but also to shifts in the public mood during the
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summer. In spring, they handled the first pandemic wave
well. However, when the public demanded to return to
everyday life, governments unraveled restrictions, and a
massive second wave ensued.
We explore the inner mechanics of technocratic pop-
ulism in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both Prime
Ministers (Andrej Babiš and Igor Matovič), leading gov-
erning coalitions that grappled with the challenge of
Covid-19, afford a rare opportunity to study populist
governance in crisis (Caiani & Graziano, 2019; Moffitt,
2015). Our analysis identifies three features of the pop-
ulist response to the pandemic. First, populists bypassed
established, institutionalized channels to combat the cri-
sis. Second, they engaged in erratic yet responsive policy
making. These two features are ubiquitous to populism.
The third feature, the instrumentalization of knowledge,
is specific to technocracy and technocratic populism.
Technocratic populists politicize expertise in order to
gain legitimacy and use narratives of expert-driven gov-
ernance to establish a direct link with voters. Therefore,
responsive crisis management, legitimized by science
and expertise, is especially conducive to their appeal.
The Czech and Slovak leaders illustrate this weaponiza-
tion of medical expertise for political purposes.
Technocratic populism is an output-oriented pop-
ulism that directly links voters to leaders via expertise.
de la Torre (2013, p. 34) used the term to describe
President Rafael Correa, formerly an economics pro-
fessor, as someone who “combine[d] populist rhetoric
with top-down technocratic policies,” and called for
the end of “partocracy” in Ecuador. Technocratic pop-
ulism arises as a response to the crisis of governance
by mainstream parties. When voters in inadequate-
ly governed states reject left-wing Tweedledums and
right-wing Tweedledees, they opt for leaders that offer
expertise outside of the dysfunctional deliberative polit-
ical realm (Pop-Eleches, 2010).
Berlusconi in Italy, Babiš in Czechia, and Ivanishvili in
Georgia turned their business expertise into political cap-
ital. Macron in France was trained as an elite-level tech-
nocrat but also worked in the banking sector. Matovič
started in a publishing business but joined the political
opposition in Slovakia during 2010. He tasered the polit-
ical establishment with clownish stunts and a decade
later, he won the elections. All the above-mentioned
leaders rejected the notion of a left-right continuum in
politics. Some of them might appear centrist, but first
and foremost, they adopt policies that are politically
expedient and responsive (Mair, 2009) to the immedi-
ate needs of pockets of voters, which they strategical-
ly target. When in power, they weaponize expertise to
undermine accountability and oversight while aggrandiz-
ing their own power.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we outline how
technocratic populism differs from other forms of pop-
ulism. Second, we justify the party classification of ANO
in the Czech Republic and OĽaNO in Slovakia as populist
parties (Zulianello, 2020). ANO (Action of Dissatisfied
Citizens), led by Andrej Babiš, presided over the pan-
demic response in the Czech Republic with the social
democrats. OĽaNO (Ordinary People and Independent
Personalities), led by Igor Matovič, formed a govern-
ing coalition with three other parties after winning the
February 2020 elections in Slovakia on an anti-corruption
platform. However, the government’s agenda was imme-
diately over-shadowed by Covid-19. We discuss the
Czech case first, and then compare and contrast it with
the Slovak case. The article concludes with a discussion
of the broader implications for the study of technocrat-
ic populism.
2. Technocratic Populism
Populism is a thin ideology (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019;
Mudde, 2019; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018) and a strat-
egy to gain power (Grzymala-Busse, 2019; Hanley &
Vachudova, 2018; Taggart, 2000; Vachudova, 2020;
Weyland, 2020) that can lead to executive aggrandize-
ment (Bermeo, 2016). Populist ideologies emphasize, as
well as combine, economic divisions, identity politics
and technocratic expertise. Populist types are defined
by the core definitions of the “people.” They respond to
three different grievances: economic inequality, identity-
based exclusion and governance that negatively affects
“ordinary people” (Canovan, 1981; Kaltwasser, Taggart,
Espejo, & Ostiguy, 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).
Technocratic populism politicizes expertise to gain
legitimacy and instrumentalizes governance (Aprasidze
& Siroky, 2020; Perottino & Guasti, 2020; Verzichelli
& Castaldo, 2020). However, it is a variant of pop-
ulism (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017) rather than the rule
of experts (Dargent, 2014). Technocratic populists’ rule
in the name of the “people” on the grounds of exper-
tise. They “strategically use the appeal of technocrat-
ic competence and weaponize numbers to deliver a
populist message” (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019, p. 304).
Furthermore, populists use technocracy in their quest
to bypass the institutions of representative democracy
(Caramani, 2017; Guasti, 2020a; Urbinati, 2019).
Table 1 locates technocratic populism as a sub-type
of populism (which pitches the elite against the “peo-
ple”). We use Canovan’s definitions of “the people”
(Canovan, 1981). Technocratic populist parties respond
to the grievances of “ordinary people” who are dissatis-
fiedwith governance bymainstreampoliticians and offer
both expertise in governance and a direct link to voters.
Exclusionary populism responds to grievances associated
with ethnic diversity, while inclusionary populism seeks
to remedy economic exclusion (Mudde & Kaltwasser,
2013). When populists opt for divisive identity politics
(Buštíková, 2020; Meguid, 2008; Mudde, 2019), they fab-
ricate the category of the “enemy of the people” and
apply it to political opponents (Pappas, 2019). Populists
maintain flexibility to define “the other” along many
identity marks, such as ethnicity, culture, language or
gender (Jenne, 2018; Vachudova, 2020). The instrumen-
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Table 1. Technocratic populism as a sub-type.
Governments
Responsible Responsive
Policies
People Grievance Universalistic Targeted
Nation Identity mainstream right exclusionary populism
Underdog Economy mainstream left (social democrats) inclusionary populism
Ordinary Governance technocracy technocratic populism
tal use of ideology is a cornerstone of populist policy
inconsistency and flexibility.
Once populists are in power, we can observe their
policy making. In Europe, the decline of social democ-
racy allowed for a populist shift to the left (Berman
& Snegovaya, 2019), yet at the same time it did not
displace identity (Kates & Tucker, 2019). In Eastern
Europe, populists have effortlessly combined exclusive
identity politics with welfare and family protection (Bill
& Stanley, 2020; Buštíková & Kitschelt, 2009; Enyedi,
2020). However, populist left-leaning economic plat-
forms do not possess the programmatic and universalis-
tic consistency of social democratic parties. Populist eco-
nomic platforms are targeted, even erratic, and disre-
gard “responsibility.” Mair identified a growing tension
between problem solving and satisfying public demands:
responsibility and responsiveness. In his words: “gov-
ernments are now finding it increasingly difficult to be
responsive to voters. In seeking to act responsibly, that
is trying to…meet the everyday responsibilities of office,
governments now find themselves…constrained” (Mair,
2009, pp. 13–14).
In order to account for the erratic nature of populism,
we highlight a distinction between targeted, responsive
policies and universalistic policies of responsible govern-
ments that provide long-term public goods (Kitschelt,
2000). Targeted policies that deliver club goods and cater
to blocks of voters are limited in scope, and typical-
ly focus on short-term gains. Extreme responsiveness
results in ad-hoc and even erratic policies crafted to
respond to immediate needs, such as those that arise
from social media, which provides populists with instan-
taneous popularity boosts.
Populists’ offerings of state-sponsored benefits to
voter-blocks is a responsive, flexible strategy that can
be used to secure votes both from the poor as well
as from the wealthy. Policy cherry-picking blurs tradi-
tional left and right divisions in politics (Edwards, 2010;
Pirro, 2017; Rovny & Polk, 2020; Szikra, 2018). Free of
responsibility, populists can at the same time lower tax-
es, inflate deficits and offer “free” public benefits to care-
fully selected segments of voters.
Most governments must strike a balance between
what voters want and what is feasible. We associate pro-
grammatic mainstream parties, such as social democrat-
ic parties, with “responsibility.” Populists, on the other
hand, are associatedwith inconsistency (Grzymala-Busse
& Nalepa, 2019) due to their “responsiveness” (Mair,
2009). Technocratic populism is a sub-type of populism.
It responds to crisis by initially offering expertise outside
the political realm but also a direct, personalized and
instantaneous accountability linkage between the lead-
er and “ordinary” supporters.
3. ANO and OĽaNO
How do populists wield power during crisis? We are
frequently limited to seeing populists in the opposition
benches. But, when populists come to power and expe-
rience crisis, we can observe how they govern. Eastern
European populists are versatile and defy typological
precisions (Bernhard et al., 2020). Nevertheless, quali-
ty of governance is a perennial weakness of both coun-
tries, since the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 (Basta
& Buštíková, 2016). Two decades later, dissatisfied vot-
ers turned to anti-establishment parties founded on the
promise to combat political corruption. ANO and OĽaNO
are two prime examples.
ANO, a technocratic populist party led by Andrej
Babiš, won the 2017 elections and has been leading a
minority coalition government since 2018 (Havlík, 2019).
Igor Matovič, who leads OĽaNO, won elections on an
anti-corruption platform and formed a governing coali-
tion in March 2020 (Gyárfášová & Učeň, 2020). Figure 1
places Czech and Slovak political parties’ score on indica-
tors of populism as measured by the Global Party Survey
(2019). The mainstream parties are in the bottom-left
quadrant, populists are in the top-right quadrant. Both
ANO and OĽaNO favor populist over pluralist rhetoric
(the x-axis) and populist rhetoric is salient in their plat-
forms (the y-axis).
ANO and OĽaNO reject programmatic divisions and
oppose traditional, “establishment” parties on the left
and right. Both have flexible and opportunistic policy
platforms that respond to shifts in public moods, social
media impulses and extensive internal polling, which pro-
vides themwith flexibility to adjust their policy positions.
ANO started as a fiscally conservative party promising
effective, lean governance in 2011. However, ANO’s core
voters in 2020 are primarily retirees who depend on
the state.
OĽaNO’s is equally versatile. During the 2019–2020
electoral campaign, IgorMatovič declared that he consid-
ered most of the far-right ĽSNS voters, as well as most of
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Figure 1. Populist vs. pluralist rhetoric and its salience among Czech and Slovak parties. Source: Norris (2020).
the leftist Smer-SD voters, to be “normal” people and he
welcomed their votes. Matovič’s lack of traditional ideol-
ogy is also reflected in the party’s manifesto, which does
not include a single word that would programmatically
relate to the left or right. OĽaNO’s manifesto divides peo-
ple into “us” vs. “them” categories. “Us” are “brave and
honest people” who deserve “to live better.” “Them” are
thieves andmafia-linked politicians who “stole the state”
and “friends of these politicians”who benefited from the
corrupt system (OĽaNO, 2020, p. 10). Matovič’s populist
electoral campaign promised justice for all.
In terms of economic policies, both ANO and OĽaNO
appeal to the segments of left leaning, working-class con-
stituents. Both “responsively” design targeted econom-
ic policies to buy off voters (Baboš, Világi, & Oravcová,
2016; Malová & Dolný, 2016) without the “responsibili-
ty” of budget constraints. Matovič advocates for sound
public finances. Yet, he refuses to eliminate redistribu-
tive policies introduced by the previous party in power,
Smer-SD, such as free trains for students or increased
pensions. Similarly, since in power, ANO accelerated
spending on targeted welfare programs, yet at the same
time, decreased taxes.
Reactive, impulsive measures driven by social media
popularity or selective access to leaders are symptoms
of populism. This is exemplified by Andrej Babiš’s appeal
on social media to “call me and I will fix it right away”
(Landsman, 2018) in his effort to micromanage every
aspect of the Czech economy. Instantaneous popularity
on social media is the ultimate measure of success. Igor
Matovič’s style is similar. He refused to hire a profession-
al spokesperson that would represent the office of the
PrimeMinister. He prefers direct communicationwith cit-
izens and extensively uses Facebook for policy updates.
He even occasionally uploads posts from Slovak cabinet
meetings live via Facebook.
Populist reactiveness is exemplified by Andrej Babiš’s
personalized efforts to “Save Max.” Maxík (little Max)
was born in June 2018 with spinal muscular dystrophy.
Drugs that can cure this condition are expensive, unavail-
able and not covered by public insurance. The cure is
available abroad and must be performed before the sec-
ond birthday of a sick child. Max’s family organized social
media campaign and raised over 2million Euro, predomi-
nantly from small donors. Their efforts generated a large
wave of solidarity and publicity. Once the collection was
concluded, the Ministry of Finance announced that the
family will have to pay value added tax (VAT) on the mon-
ey raised. Public backlash ensued. Max’s advocates criti-
cized the state for failing to rescue a sick child as well as
for predating on civic solidarity.
Under mounting criticism, Prime Minster Babiš got
involved. In his weekly Sunday recordings “Čau lidi”
(“Hi people”) on Facebook, he proclaimed that he will
make every effort to “Save Max.” First, Babiš promised
to suspend the VAT and to find a legal tax loophole.
When no loophole was found, Babiš opted to “have a
call” with public health insurance providers. In a mirac-
ulous turn of events, in April 2020, the two largest pub-
lic insurance companies decided to alter their policies
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for Max and two other boys in a need of identical treat-
ment for spinal muscular dystrophy (Kubátová, 2020).
The insurers decided to fully cover the treatment for
three boys. The public was enthusiastic and praised the
PrimeMinister for saving three kids. Babiš hijacked a civic
initiative to increase his visibility and popularity. There
was no policy adaptation. Parents and patients in similar
situations and in need of unavailable treatments there-
fore would need to organize an online campaign and
hope to catch his eye.
4. Pandemic Response in Czechia
The official platform of ANO revolves around four
issues: security, state effectiveness, state investment
and human capital investment. Babiš’s motto is to “run
the state as a firm” as a testament to his business
background (Buštíková & Guasti, 2019). In 2017, ANO
won elections with almost 30% of the vote; and in
2018, it formed a minority government with the Social
Democrats. Once in charge, Babiš went on a spending
spree with a range of policies targeting older and poor
voters. ANO aggressively increased both salaries and
the numbers of employees who depend on the state
for living.
In 2019, the government’s target for 2020 was a bud-
get deficit of 40 billion Czech crowns (1,5 billion Euro).
However, the coronavirus crisis forced more spending.
In April 2020, the government widened the target to a
projected record deficit of 500 billion crowns (18,8 bil-
lion Euro). Although ANO runs on a platform of a lean,
business-like efficient state, the state under his rule had
become over-bloated, even before the pandemic.
The Covid-19 crisis in the spring of 2020 tested the
state’s effectiveness. The government reacted swiftly
and introduced strict emergency measures on March 11.
Schools, non-essential business and offices were shut
down. Non-essential travel was restricted and borders
with neighboring countrieswere closed. According to the
Ministry of Health, as of September 4, 2020, Czechia, a
country of 10,6 million people, registered 26,452 cases
and 426 deaths. From the standpoint of public health,
the first wave of the pandemic was handled successful-
ly (Guasti, 2020b).
ANO imposed unconstitutional measures to protect
public health (Guasti, 2020a), including the closure of
the border. The Chief of the Emergency Task Force dur-
ing the first wave, Roman Prymula, floated the idea that
borders might remain closed for two years. The gov-
ernment forbade Czech citizens to leave the country
(with some exceptions), as part of the emergency mea-
sures. For many, it was reminiscent of the iron curtain.
Opposition politicians called the measure unconstitu-
tional and the Senate started to prepare a complaint for
the Constitutional court. Anticipating legal defeat, the
government backed off and opened the borders (for its
own citizens) in late April. For foreigners, the borders
remained sealed.
A large component of the success in taming Covid-19
has to be attributed to the surge of civil society activism,
volunteering, solidarity, human capital mobilization and
exemplary compliance with public safety measures, at
least during the first wave (Tabery, 2020). The state
required all citizens to wear masks in public, initially
including streets, parks, shops and public transportation
and introduced fines for non-compliance. However, since
masks were sold out and practically unavailable both for
citizens and health care workers, citizens responded by
producing home-mademasks and home-made hand san-
itizers. These were distributed via friendship circles, civic
organizations and volunteer groups. Health and hospital
workers lacked masks, respirators and protective gear as
well. This led to the outpouring of private donations and
to innovation (such asmasks printed on 3Dprinters). Civil
society plugged the holes where the state had failed.
Andrej Babiš first mocked the use of masks and
then forced the whole country to dig up their sewing
machines, while threatening non-compliance with fines.
Then, he jumped on the civil society bandwagon.
On March 28, 2020, he sent a tweet to President Trump
with a link to the viral #Masks4All video: Mr.President
@realDonaldTrump, try tackling virus the Czech way.
Wearing a simple clothmask decreases the spread of the
virus by 80%! CzechRepublic hasmade itOBLIGATORY for
its citizens towear amask in the public (Babiš, 2020). Just
like with the “Save Max” campaign, the Prime Minister
used a viral social-media activity to present himself as a
“man of the people” and to claim credit for the actions
of civil society.
The crisis showcased Andrej Babiš’s instantaneous
responsiveness. In a press conference onMarch 14, Babiš
was asked to address severe shortages of respirators
in hospitals and among health workers. He denied it:
“It is not true that health workers do not have respi-
rators. Tell me where, I will personally deliver (respira-
tors) to them” (Bartoníček, 2020). Babiš later apologized
and acknowledged the shortages. To secure the neces-
sary supplies, social democratic Vice Prime Minister and
the Minister of Interior Jan Hamáček used personal net-
works in China to purchase PPE. When a Chinese plane
landed in Prague on March 20 with more than one mil-
lion respirators in the amount of 75million Czech crowns
(2,760 thousand Euros), both the Prime Minister Babiš
and the Vice Prime Minister Hamáček greeted the cargo
personally at the tarmac. In the midst of the pandemic,
the highest officials from both governing parties compet-
ed for media attention over the PPE (for which Czechia
had overpaid).
Tensions between Babiš’s ANO and the Social
Democrats, a junior coalition partner, extended beyond
the sight of the cameras. Each party controlled different
portfolios and the government branches were compet-
ingwith each othermore than coordinating. TheMinistry
of Health (controlled by ANO) was also purchasing respi-
rators andmedical supplies fromChina, independently of
the Ministry of Interior (controlled by Social Democrats),
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and for a higher price. The Ministry of Interior paid 1,5
to 2,5 Euro for one FFP2 respirator, but the Ministry of
Health paid up to 5 Euro per piece (Novák, 2020). Despite
the rhetoric, effective governance was clearly lacking.
Because the government was purchasing medical
supplies under emergency measures, oversight and
transparency in public procurement were suspended.
Small Czech firms and firms with limited political connec-
tions were excluded from pandemic-related acquisitions
by all ministries. The quick, non-transparent process of
spending public funds invited corruption. The Supreme
Audit Office (Nejvyšší kontrolní úřad) initiated an inves-
tigation into suspicious public procurement of medi-
cal supplies immediately after the emergency measures
were terminated on May 17.
When recapitulating the crisis, Babiš praised the
emergency measures in a radio interview on May 7:
“Finally, I was able to run the state as a…firm, it was effec-
tive and to the point. We were able to see our decisions
implemented right away” (iDNES.cz, 2020). The desire to
manage the crisis as directly as possible led to bypass-
ing institutional guidelines that were put in place in
cases of emergency. In the initial stages, this led to
chaos, but it gave Babiš maximum control over the pan-
demic response and focused media attention on him.
Furthermore, these unorthodox steps were justified by
relying on a loyal, handpicked, expert. Epidemiologist
Roman Prymula, a non-elected DeputyMinister, became
the public face of the pandemic response.
Technocratic populism in a pandemic is a double-
edged sword. Expertise was prioritized over deliberation.
Panicked citizens followed cues on the importance of
masks and distancing, which allowed the government to
tame the virus in the first wave. Responsiveness is com-
patible with “blunt” measures that do not require fine
tuning, like shutting the borders or lockdowns. These
measures immediately satisfied the public urge for safe-
ty and were effective from the public health standpoint.
However, in order to combat the virus over the long
run, governments need to implement responsible poli-
cies that require higher levels of state capacity, coordi-
nation and meticulous planning.
Although there is a Central Emergency Task Force
(ústřední krizový štáb) to respond to emergencies such as
natural disasters and epidemics, which has always been
headed by an elected minister, Prime Minister Babiš
bypassed the (Social Democratic) Minister of Interior Jan
Hamáček. Instead, he selected epidemiologist Roman
Prymula to lead the fight against the virus. Babiš bent the
rules to control the task force directly. Professor Prymula
holds the rank of colonel and is an expert on vaccines
and immunization. Even though he lacked the security
clearance required for all Deputy Ministers, he activat-
ed the Central Emergency Task Force on March 16 and
began coordinating the purchase of respirators, medical
supplies and PPEs.
Without a minister in charge, the task force’s abili-
ty to coordinate procurement and response was under-
mined. On March 30, Prymula was forced out, although
during the second wave he became the Minister of
Health. Adam Vojtěch, the first sacrificial lamb, was
forced to resign on September 21 to deflect blame away
from the Prime Minister. His technocratic replacement,
Prymula, was sacked on October 23 to appease public
anger as the crisis was spiraling out of control in autumn.
During the first wave, Roman Prymula was the star of
press conferences along with the Prime Minister. When
asked who is in charge to combat the pandemic, Babiš
noted: “Forme, the biggest expert is the DeputyMinister
Prymula.We are in touch online. All the time” (Guryčová,
2020). Prymula’s popularity rose. Eventually, he out-
shone both the PrimeMinister and hisMinister of Health
Vojtěch. A representative survey from early April found
that Prymula was perceived by more than a third of the
adult population (34%) as the person who contributes
most to the efforts to combat the spread of the coron-
avirus.Minister of Interior Hamáček received the second-
best marks, closely followed by Babiš. The public per-
ceived the ANO Minister of Health, Vojtěch, as marginal
compared to Prymula, Hamáček and Babiš (National
Pandemic Alarm, 2020).
Babiš shielded himself with Prymula’s medical exper-
tise, which helped him to usurp power and the media
spotlight. He undercut his junior coalition partner and
the political opposition. Babiš viewed Hamáček as a com-
petent political rival who could outshine him, which led
to tension in the governing coalition. Most important-
ly, Babiš’s decision to elevate Prymula interfered with a
delicately designed system of institutional response in
which the Ministry of Interior played a vital coordinating
role. It undermined the efforts of the Central Emergency
Task Force because the Ministry of Interior, controlled by
Social Democratic minister Hamáček, could not effective-
ly co-ordinate with a Ministry of Health, controlled by
ANO’s minister Vojtěch.
After mishaps, chaos and criticism, Babiš eventually
ceded. Hamáček took over the Emergency Task Force on
March 30. When the crisis eased, the task force was dis-
solved on June 11. When asked about the tensions over
the task force leadership, Hamáček suggested that the
Prime Minister:
Initially did not know what the Central Emergency
Task Force is supposed to do. [Babiš] was afraid that
this will result in dual governance. I have been telling
him since the beginning that nobody questioned the
role of government that needs expert recommenda-
tions to make decisions. That is the job of the Central
Emergency Task Force. (Tomek, 2020)
ANO politicized expertise. State and regional chief
hygienists and epidemiology advisors found themselves
in the hot seat. Rastislav Maďar, an epidemiology advi-
sor to the Minister of Health Vojtěch resigned in August,
after the government issued a set of contradictory guide-
lines about whether students should wear masks when
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they go back to school in September. He refused to be
blamed for the chaos.
The Chief Hygienist Eva Gottvaldová who under-
played the threat of Covid-19 was sacked in March 2020.
Shewas replaced by Jarmila Rážová,whowas taskedwith
developing a system of tracing and prevention. The sys-
tem of tracing (e-Rouška) has been ineffective, despite
the state’s efforts to implement it since the summer.
Citizens were therefore encouraged to make their own
calls to people they were in contact with if they tested
positive. Do-it-yourself mask making has turned into do-
it-yourself tracing. In the words of the Head Hygienist of
Prague, Zdeňka Jágrová, “I am very sorry, but we can-
not handle tracing” (“Omlouvám se, nejsme schopni to
zvládat,’’ 2020).
To undermine the system of prevention more, Prime
Minister Babiš did not comply with official Covid-19
policies. He refused to go into quarantine, as required,
when the Chief Hygienist Rážová was tested positive on
September 2, 2020. Babiš and Rážová were in close phys-
ical contact at meetings. Complying with a two-week
quarantine requirement would diminish Babiš’s ability to
participate in campaign events for regional and Senate
elections in October 2020. In sum, although the num-
ber of deaths in the Czech Republic from Covid-19 was
comparatively low after the first wave that ended in
the summer, the system of prevention was not robust
(Guasti, 2020b).
The government used expertise to justify political
decisions and was not interested in promoting inde-
pendent expert deliberations. The opposition, already
restrained by emergency measures and tamed by fears
of the virus, wanted to scrutinize expertise behind gov-
ernment decisions. It called for numbers, predictions and
analysis that validated government steps. Expert-driven
response was guided by epidemiological concerns. Data
on patients and testing were collected by the Institute of
Health Information and Statistics (ÚZIS) at the Ministry
of Health (under ANO). The government was criticized
for not sharing medical data and the underlying analysis
that guided policy decisions. Academics, medical experts
and data analysts could not access data to simulate inde-
pendent epidemiological models (Šustr, 2020). ÚZIS was
not even sharing data with other ministries and econom-
ic consultants working for the government.
Daniel Münich, a member of the economic advisory
team of the Central Emergency Task Force, complained
that Prymula kicked him out of the meeting at the
Ministry of Health when he asked for more data. In his
view, limiting access to epidemiological data hampered
his team’s efforts to forecast the economic impacts of the
pandemic. TheMinistry of Health countered, citing priva-
cy concerns over data sharing. Similarly, political opposi-
tion also requestedmore data, transparency and alterna-
tive expert views. InMay 2020, the Senate issued a public
statement asking the government to share expertise:
When making long term strategic plans, the govern-
ment does not work in a systematic manner with rel-
evant data. Until to this day, the government did not
issue a detailed analysis of the evolution of Covid-19
epidemic and the impact of the epidemic on citizens’
health and the Czech economy. (KoroNERV-20, 2020)
Babiš controlled the narrative in the first wave: he saved
the country by following the recommendations of a
prominent expert. He touted the low infection rate and
a low death count as a national victory. Babiš also used
the adherence of expertise to stir populist sentiments.
When Angela Merkel warned German citizens in March
that up to sixty percent of Germans might get infect-
ed, Andrej Babiš accused her of spreading panic and
suggested that Europe is not doing enough: “The Czech
Republic took preventive measures sooner than all coun-
tries in Europe, including Germany, precisely so that we
prevent massive spread of the virus. We were the first
ones to ban direct flights from Italy…we closed schools”
(ČTK, 2020).
Initially, the Covid-19 crisis strengthened ANO. In July,
polling agencies estimated that up to 32% of respon-
dents would vote for ANO, a two percent increase
in preferences since 2017. However, the Senate and
regional elections during the outbreak of the second
wave in October revealed that ANO’s support plateaued.
However, due to political fragmentation, no other party
is in a position to challenge ANO’s dominance (Buštíková
& Guasti, 2017). In the pandemic, ANO continued to
build a strong electoral foundation by maintaining ideo-
logical flexibility, expanding the state, deepening deficits
and targeting voters with benefits.
Babiš established a direct link with voters to selec-
tively communicate expertise. The novel coronavirus
response was consulted with health experts but was
not subject to expert deliberations. Expertise was
used instrumentally to bypass institutionalized channels
to combat crisis. It legitimized ANO’s leadership and
strengthened a mode of populist responsiveness. In the
first wave, Prime Minister’s party ANO won the pandem-
ic popularity contest. We now compare and contrast this
with the pandemic response in Slovakia.
5. Pandemic Response in Slovakia
OĽaNO’s victory in 2020 signaled a rejection of the incum-
bent party, Smer-SD (Direction—Social Democracy),
which had been in power since 2006. Smer-SD, led by
Robert Fico, was founded as a social democratic par-
ty but later embraced populism (Bugaric, 2008), build-
ing on what has become a perennial feature of Slovak
politics. Smer-SD combined targeted welfare policies
with fiscal liberalism to maximize power. Two ruptures
reshaped party politics in Slovakia and strengthened pop-
ulist politics. First, the migration crisis of 2015, which
coincided with the parliamentary elections campaign in
March 2016, destabilized the political system. Second,
the politically motivated murder of an investigative jour-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 496–508 502
nalist, Ján Kuciak, and his fiancée in 2018 destroyed
Fico’s legitimacy.
The murder of Ján Kuciak accelerated the rise of
an anti-establishment “movement,” OĽaNO. Deep ties
between the leading figures of Smer-SD, the mafia, and
corrupt members of the justice system undermined
public trust in the ruling parties and state institutions.
Public outrage, followed by mass protests, forced Prime
Minister Fico to resign. Igor Matovič, a prominent and
credible critic of corruption since 2010, a self-appointed
leader of the opposition, seized the opportunity andwon
the 2020 parliamentary elections with 25% of the popu-
lar vote.
Igor Matovič rejected established parties, which he
refers to as “the partocracy” (Malová & Dolný, 2016,
p. 4). As a very innovative presenter, skilled in utiliz-
ing social media and in attracting media attention, he
prefers direct communication with citizens and does not
have a spokesperson (as of October 12, 2020). Richard
Pekar, the head of the Press Office of the Government,
told media in June: “Igor Matovič is too sensitive to
allow anybody to speak in his name” (Mikušovič, 2020).
After being asked if he advised the Prime Minister on
what he posts on Facebook, he replied: “No. The Prime
Minister considers his Facebook profile to be his person-
al matter. He insists rather strongly he remains himself”
(Mikušovič, 2020).
As a man of the people, Matovič prefers to connect
directly with voters, yet at the same time, like Babiš, he
exercises a firm grip on his party. Like ANO, OĽaNO has
an almost non-existent party organization and no party
base. The party had only fourmembers between 2012 to
2016. In late 2019, the government amended the Law on
Political Parties, which introduced minimum standards
for political parties, such as a minimum number of par-
ty members. To comply with the rules, OĽaNO increased
the number of its members to 45.
During the 2020 campaign, Matovič broadened the
scope of his populist appeals. OĽaNO’s core appeal was
anti-corruption, but it expanded the platform to include
salient issues such as healthcare and childcare. In a
brazen populist move, the party crowdsourced its elec-
toral manifesto. IgorMatovič launched an online opinion
poll that proposed eleven policy ideas. The poll was open
to all Slovak citizens, regardless of political affiliation, and
it attracted considerable media attention. 67,415 peo-
ple participated in the poll. However, most policies pro-
posed by Matovič were impossible to implement or of
questionable legal standing. For example, one of the poli-
cies was a pledge to cancer patients that they will have
a right to be operated in two weeks after their diagno-
sis. The poll sent a strong signal that OĽaNO responds to
ordinary people’s grievances.
On February 29, 2020, OĽaNO won elections.
Matovič formed a governing coalition and his govern-
ment was appointed on March 21. The vote of investi-
ture took place in themiddle of the pandemic on April 30.
In the meantime, the outgoing Prime Minister Pellegrini
and the Central Emergency Task Force (CETF) spear-
headed the Covid-19 response. The Law on Governing
State in Emergency Situations (National Council of the
Slovak Republic, 2002) defines the Central Emergency
Task Force as the supreme advisory and coordinating
body that synchronizes the various ministries, regional
authorities and municipalities. The government, as the
only executive body with the power to approve binding
decisions, has to approve CETF’s proposals tomake them
legally valid.
Initially, an emergency situation (výnimočná situá-
cia) was announced on March 11. It allowed the gov-
ernment to procure emergency supplies for hospitals
and other medical institutions. The state of emergen-
cy was declared several days later. At his request and
before assuming the office, Igor Matovič’s was regular-
ly invited to the meetings of the CETF organized by
the outgoing government. Leaders of the new coali-
tion led by OĽaNO were critical of Pellegrini’s pandem-
ic response and viewed the mitigation measures as slow
and insufficient.
Igor Matovič assumed power on March 21, 2020 and
set upon a course of instantaneous responsiveness. The
government was sworn in on Saturday. It worked hard
the whole weekend, which signaled to the public that
the new team powered through sleepless nights for the
benefit of the people. The first wave of the pandem-
ic revealed Matovič’s populist tendencies in executive
office in three ways. First, he created informal struc-
tures, parallel to the state institutions, to address the
coronavirus pandemic. Second, in the absence of ideol-
ogy, he relied on expertise as an alternative legitimation
mechanism. Third, like Babiš, Matovič was very respon-
sive to public reactions to the governmentmeasures and
adapted very swiftly when faced with a vocal, dissatis-
fied public.
On Monday, March 23, after less than 48 hours
in office, Matovič ditched the Central Emergency Task
Force (CETF) used by the outgoing government and
established a new, parallel institution: “The Permanent
Emergency Task Force” (PETF; Office of Government,
2020). PETF was officially tasked with gathering and ana-
lyzing pandemic related information and coordinating
the government, ministries, and other state authorities.
However, PETF was problematic. From a constitutional
standpoint, Slovakia has a well-developed system of cri-
sis management, including institutions responsible for
particular tasks in crisis management. The legal frame-
work explicitly defines the competences of various actors.
However, the tasks and competences of the new PETF
institution set up by Matovič overlapped with the exist-
ing bodies. Second, PETF was illegal, since Matovič cre-
ated PETF using his “decree powers”: he signed a docu-
ment that established a brand-new crisis management
task force. Only about a month later, Matovič official-
ly provided the cabinet with the “information” that he
founded PETF. Afterwards, the cabinet voted to acknowl-
edge it.
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Neither the constitution nor any other law gives the
Prime Minister the power to create new governing bod-
ies. Therefore, any consequences that originated from,
or were based upon, PETF’s decisions might be ren-
dered unconstitutional in the future. Moreover, the PETF
statute assumes the existence of an appointed staff sec-
retary responsible for producing and keeping meeting
records. The PETF never appointed any secretary and
no meeting records have been kept. The new govern-
ment made critical decisions without transparency or
traceable accountability. Facing crisis, Matovič abused
his power. The existing legal framework had processes
in place to provide for an optimal functioning of the legal
task force. It was unnecessary to establish the PETF, a par-
allel institution to CETF. The government violated official
procedures and did not comply with institutional rules
and norms.
During the first wave of the pandemic, Igor Matovič,
as well as Andrej Babiš combined technocratic expertise
with populism. Public health epidemiologists played an
important role in taming the public health crisis, and dur-
ing the first wave Slovakia did exceptionally well. Before
the second wave hit the country, Slovakia had the small-
est number of Covid-19 deaths per capita in Europe.
However, Matovič’s government also relied on medical
professionals to provide legitimacy for other decisions
as needed. Two examples illustrate politicized expertise:
curfew and supermarket opening hours.
The government introduced a six-day curfew to pre-
vent domestic travel that could increase the spread of
the virus, which experts had recommended. To avoid
the curfew, many chose to travel one day in advance.
Upon introduction, the police units blocked traffic in the
capital, and people spent hours stuck on the highway.
Dissatisfied people voiced anger on social media, and tra-
ditionalmedia soon followed. The PrimeMinister deflect-
ed the blame for comprehensive controls onto the Police.
The Police Chief pushed back and argued that the Police
only enforced the government decree, which did not
have any provisions that would allow the police to check
vehicles randomly. Matovič responded with a press con-
ference andwith Facebook posts inwhich he accused the
Police Chief of misunderstanding government intentions.
As a true populist, Matovič’s resolved the issue directly
with citizens, as he was used to doing as an opposition
politician. Yet, this time, he attacked his own policy and a
branch of government that was implementing his orders.
The second example relates to shopping regulations
during the pandemic. The government made two con-
troversial decisions. First, seniors were limited to shop
only between 9 and 12 (later reduced to 11) in the
morning. The association of seniors, lawyers and the
Public Defender of Rights criticized this policy. Matovič
resorted to expertise to reject criticism: “I will respect
whatever the consilium of experts approve. The Chief
Public Health Officer makes the final decision” (“Igor
Matovič stojí za,” 2020). This time, the Prime Minister
put on his technocratic hat and was not responsive for
two reasons. Pensioners typically do not vote for OĽaNO
and public pressure to change the opening hours was
neither strong nor sustained. Second, the Permanent
Emergency Task Force decided that shops must close
on Sundays to sanitize the shop floors and for workers
to rest. The shop closure was unpopular, but Matovič
defended it as an expert recommendation: “Some peo-
ple might want warm pastries [on Sundays], but the
experts will decide” (Dibáková, 2020).
The beginning of Igor Matovič’s tenure was defined
by the combination of technocratic and populist gov-
ernance. As a former anti-establishment politician who
campaigned on mistrust in formal institutions, he estab-
lished parallel institutions with dubious legal standing to
respond to the pandemic. As a technocrat, he relied on
expertise from epidemiologists. As a populist, however,
he did not hesitate to overturn expert decisions when
pressed by public opinion. After winning elections, he
further cultivated his unmediated communication style
with citizens, even if it undermined his own governance.
Responsive and impulsive actions that cater to immedi-
ate voter needs have been key to his leadership. He has
enhanced his populist appeal further by instrumentaliz-
ing expertise during the pandemic.
6. Conclusion
How do populists govern in crisis? This study compares
the Czech and Slovak responses to the threat of Covid-19.
Igor Matovič and Andrej Babiš followed the recommen-
dations of health experts. From the epidemiological per-
spective, both countries performed well during the first
wave. However, they did not subject officially endorsed
health expertise to alternative viewpoints. Furthermore,
during the first wave, they did not invest in state capacity
required to combat the second wave, such as an effec-
tive system of tracing, locating and isolating hot-spots.
Public health expertise was exploited to silence criticism
and used to justify policies during the state of emergency
that did not follow formal rules. Expertise was also used
to bypass institutionalized channels to combat crises and
to establish a mode of an instantaneous response to the
pandemic threat.
Both countries, especially Slovakia, handled the out-
break of the novel coronavirus well. Using politicized
expertise, responsiveness and mass mobilization, Andrej
Babiš and Igor Matovič, won the pandemic popularity
contest in the first wave. The Slovak success can be
attributed to the government’s responsiveness, but to
other issues as well. First, the international mobility
of Slovaks is low, which confined the virus territorially.
Second, the Slovak health care system is perceived by the
public as inefficient. In anticipation of its collapse, citi-
zens obeyed mitigation measures, for they feared that
they would not receive adequate care if infected.
Easy come, easy go. Because the first wave was
tamed, and because voters wanted to go on vacation
and to ditch their masks, Babiš’s government loosened
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almost all restrictions over the summer. However, new
cases started rising up at an astonishing rate in late
September, catching the Czech Republic unprepared
and without an adequate system of tracing. Nothing
can demonstrate the pitfalls of responsiveness better
than Babiš’s reaction to the autumn surge of positive
cases on his weekly Facebook feed: “Hi people, the
public demanded that we loosen up, and so, we did.
Unfortunately, we were wrong” (“Čau lidi, byla poptáv-
ka,” 2020).
Crisis strengthens populists and so did the pandem-
ic (Bieber, in press; Guasti & Mansfeldova, 2018; Kriesi
& Pappas, 2015; Moffitt, 2015). In Slovakia, a new-
ly elected populist prime minster used expertise to
weaken formal institutions and to legitimize responsive,
often erratic, decisions. In the Czech Republic, the pan-
demic entrenched technocratic populism. In both coun-
tries, populists used emergency powers to undermine
institutional accountability and to paralyze civil society
(Bernhard, 2020). Andrej Babiš and Igor Matovič rein-
forced personalized ties with voters and pursued border-
line unconstitutional policies that were both respon-
sive and technocratic. Yet, economies weakened by lock-
downs will undermine all governments in the future.
The spring surge in solidarity, quick yet blunt measures,
and responsiveness driven by medical expertise worked
miracles in the first wave. Unfortunately, it may have set
the stage for failure in the second wave, which requires
responsible, de-politicized and fine-tuned governance.
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